I’ve previously discussed Britain’s nukes-and-NATO approach to security, and the ever-rising cost of maintaining the “Great Power” façade of a long-range, full-spectrum aggressive military capability. This approach is based on a certain mindset – that security and national status derive from a threatening posture and high military spending – and the way we cling to the idiosyncratic concept of nuclear deterrence.
Just as our security does not really depend on massive spending, nor does it really depend on nuclear deterrence. Britain’s nuclear weapons are a national vanity project; as Ernest Bevin put it to Attlee, “I don’t want any other Foreign Secretary of this country to be talked to, or at, by a Secretary of State in the United States as I have… We’ve got to have this thing, whatever it costs… and we’ve got to have the bloody Union Jack on top of it”. And so it began purely as a prestige project; there was no reference to Russia, or any other threat to which the bomb would be a military answer. It was driven by personal pique and delusions of grandeur. It’s always been a grandiose PR exercise with a blank cheque.
Yet these status-symbols were dressed up and justified (after the fact) through the language and posture of nuclear deterrence. The only serious argument for deterrence is that it seems to have worked so far. But, has it? First, define “work”. Does it mean that war is prevented, or that the country with nukes is never attacked? Hardly – there are dozens of counterexamples. Does it mean that a country which has nukes, always gets its way? Too many counterexamples to that, as well. The coercive diplomacy sometimes called “nuclear blackmail” clearly doesn’t work – many times, nuclear-armed nations have lost wars against non-nuclear ones. So, clearly it’s only a specific kind of war which is supposed to be deterred – an existential one. Argentina, for example, was not deterred from attacking the Falkland islands, because they correctly assumed that the territory at issue was not sufficiently important to justify going nuclear. It would have to be a war in which losing meant conquest and the end of national independence, or to put it more accurately, the replacement of the existing ruling elite and regime, with another one; a war like World War 2, for example. The bogeyman put forward as posing such a threat to Britain was, for most of my life, the USSR. It wasn’t a real threat, and doesn’t exist today. Our nukes did not deter the regional wars, proxy conflicts, or brushfires which seemed to be continuously breaking out somewhere. They didn’t deter the real, major wars in Korea, Vietnam, or the middle East. The war which we were told to fear, the one which only nukes could deter, was an all-out war between the US-led West and the USSR, which would start with an invasion of Western Europe, and which would rapidly go nuclear and escalate until all the missiles and bombs had been used, the entire northern hemisphere was destroyed and the world plunged into nuclear winter. So, the threatened use of nukes on both sides of this putative conflict was justified (by both sides) as being the only way to avoid the use of nukes by both sides. Those who pointed out the illogicality of creating the risk of global destruction in order to avoid that very same global destruction (maybe), were patronised as “useful idiots” who were either unpatriotic, or working for the other side.
But, “deterrence” has to mean more than just “the avoidance of a nuclear war so far”. And, of course, you can’t prove the counterfactual. The usual argument for deterrence is, that it was only the West’s nukes that stopped the USSR invading western Europe. This is, logically, unprovable, and in reality, easily debunked by the historical records, which show that the Soviet leadership never contemplated the conquest of Western Europe.
It is more arguable that we have been spared a nuclear war, not because of nuclear deterrence, but in spite of it.
Deterrence has no Plan B; it works, until eventually it doesn’t, at which point, we all die. There are many possible paths to a war which destroys civilisation; it’s come fairly close a number of times already. Cuba in 1962 is the classic example, followed by well known cases of near-disastrous false alarms, such as one in 1983 when the Soviet radar system malfunctioned. The little known (because discussion of it has been actively suppressed) USS Liberty incident in 1967 saw nuclear-armed aircraft actually take off; something which didn’t happen in the Cuban crisis. Then, of course, the fact that we still have conventional wars, such as the one in Ukraine, but also elsewhere, which could all too easily escalate and go nuclear. The slow but steady drumbeat of proliferation has seen India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea all develop the bomb and deploy it ready for use. These countries may have lower barriers to use than the original five nuclear powers, and are more likely to make the first use; in short, they aren’t reliably deterred. If nukes are the last resort weapon, some of those countries could, relatively quickly, find themselves in a last resort situation. And, look at the kind of people who have the ability to press a nuclear button: Narendra Modi, Benjamin Netanyahu, Kim Jong Un, Donald Trump, Vladimir Putin; and look how close hawkish advisers like Curtis LeMay have been to the button-pressers. Some of them are mentally unstable, some hold apocalyptic religious views, and all are likely to be succeeded in the coming years by people in a similar mould who we know even less about. Which other countries might decide to join the club in future? Iran? Taiwan? South Korea? All of them are capable of it (technically and financially); all of them have domestic advocates for such a policy. It’s not just a US vs. USSR stand-off any more; there are multiple possible stand-offs, like India/Pakistan, Taiwan/China, Israel/Iran, or North/South Korea. For it to be said to “work”, deterrence has to be 100% perfect, in every possible stand-off, through any possible crisis, forever. Any time it doesn’t work, the likelihood is that within hours of the first bomb being used, they are all used.
A heavily armed, hair-trigger stand-off cannot, therefore, be a long term plan. Eventually, the weapons will be used, whether by escalation from conventional war; by deliberate surprise attack; by accident, false alarm, or malfunction; through unauthorised actions by lower level commanders; through ever more proliferation; through theft or terrorism; even, as foreseen in fiction, through automation of the launch decision by AI. The Mexican stand-off of deterrence is only (arguably) acceptable at all if it leads, inevitably and quickly, along a path to another situation in which the threat of global destruction is lifted. A world, in fact, without nukes. It’s not other countries which are a threat; it’s nuclear weapons themselves, theirs and ours. We can only be sure that nuclear weapons will not be used, ever, if there are none. Either we abolish them, or they will abolish us.
This realisation is, once again, easier for others to see than for us (ie. us British). There are nine nuclear armed nations: 122 others have negotiated a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons, as they can see that the vanity and posturing of the 9 threatens everyone, not just the obvious potential belligerent parties in a nuclear war. The 9 are basically saying, the survival of our nation, its ruling class and its system of government, is more important than the survival of humanity; so if our independence is under existential threat, we’ll use the weapons which will destroy the world. In this way, we are all held hostage to, for example, the survival in power of Kim Jong Un or the Chinese Communist party. The immorality and illogic of this posture is, perhaps, only obvious to those who are the hostages in this scenario; those whose countries would not be party to such a war, but would be destroyed by it anyway. In the end, perhaps it will be down to them to get it into our stubborn heads.
Say this out loud, though, and you cast yourself as the apostate, the unbeliever in a world of people who learned in childhood to talk in the language of deterrence and not to question the argument that it works. I know this well, as I was brought up to not-think that way myself. Indeed, acceptance of it is almost the only qualification needed to become Prime Minister; the first task a newly appointed PM is given to carry out, is to write instructions to the captains of the Trident submarines as to what revenge they should wreak if London goes offline due to being nuked. Even those of us who aren’t Prime Ministers will occasionally be confronted with similar fantasy scenarios designed to catch us out or expose our naïve pacifism. Suppose Germany had developed the bomb in 1940, they say? Summoning, as usual, the ghost of Hitler so common in British conversation. Or, they ask some other question designed to parachute you into the dream world of counterfactual situations. One might ask, in return, would it have been a good thing if the Saxons had nukes in 1066, and had used them to see off the Normans, in the process laying waste to England and France? At what other time in our history, or that of any other country, would it have been a good thing for any side, in any conflict, to have been able to blow up half the world? And, if you can think of no such example, why is it different now?
Then they conjure up future fantasy situations: suppose we all disarm, but (Iran/North Korea/some tinpot dictatorship) secretly re-creates it and springs a surprise on us? Wouldn’t we all be held to ransom? Well, come to mention it, no we wouldn’t. An agreed nuclear disarmament regime would include a perfectly viable enforcement mechanism. In fact, one already exists: under the non-proliferation treaty (NPT), non-nuclear signatory nations are inspected to ensure they aren’t developing a bomb in secret. A nuclear weapons programme is a big thing; you need exotic stuff (uranium, plutonium, other artificial elements, enrichment facilities, factories, test sites, delivery systems, missiles, planes, rockets, re-entry vehicles, you name it). Stuff that’s hard to conceal from satellites. So, the chances of such a surprise development are very much smaller than the chances of an irrational, fanatical autocrat taking control of an existing nuclear-armed nation. Someone like, say, Trump, or Netanyahu, or a LePen/Farage/Orban figure in Britain or France.
If someone argues that it’s all too late, the cat’s out of the bag, you can’t un-invent the bomb, the design is common knowledge now, and anyone can download it; well, one has to point out that it has worked for chemical weapons, which are, by comparison, very easy to make. Also that they are going against the position of the 191 states which have signed the NPT, one term of which is that the nuclear-armed states agree to pursue good-faith negotiations aimed at the elimination of their nuclear arsenals. Only five nations are not party to this treaty (Israel, India, Pakistan, North Korea, and South Sudan). So the diplomatic world is happily signed up to the principle, even if they ignore their obligations in practice. The point is, the treaty leading to nuclear disarmament already exists and we have already signed it; the pity is, we didn’t really mean it. The job facing the world now is to apply enough pressure to the original five to live up to their obligations, and to deal with the rogue states who haven’t signed up. On the outcome of this task, all our lives depend.